Abstract: Sounding convincing in order to convince -this simple strategy seems to come in handy for politicians trying to win over the electorate. Strong epistemic modality, which allows politicians to express a great degree of commitment to the truth of the utterance, pervades political discourse in general and parliamentary discourse in particular. The aim of the paper is to examine the linguistic devices employed to express certainty and commitment, i.e. to study strong epistemic modality systematically in the UK parliamentary language. The examination is carried out on strong epistemic adverbs, verbs, nouns and adjectives both quantitatively and qualitatively, and some reflections regarding their use in the Labour and the opposition discourse are presented. The results point to a relatively strong presence of strong epistemic modality in parliamentary discourse and light is shed on the ways it is used in this type of discourse.
Introduction
In political discourse, as a type of persuasive discourse, politicians are in the business of selling their products -their policies and their point of view, i.e. their "truth". However, the "truth" seems to be relative in both language and politics and even prone to scalar representation. What matters more than the substance and facts themselves is that politicians express a high degree of confidence and commitment to the truth of what they say. Simply put, being convinced and convincing is a prerequisite needed to influence the opinions and attitudes of others.
To express the degrees of truth and their commitment to it, politicians have an array of linguistic devices at their disposal, termed and classified in different ways in literature. It is therefore the aim of this paper to study the devices used to express a high degree of commitment to the truth of the utterance in political discourse.
In this light, I apply the scalarity principle in the study of epistemic modality and consequently study "strong" epistemic modality on a corpus taken from a parliamentary budget debate conducted in the UK House of Commons in 2010. Parliamentary discourse is considered to be par excellence political discourse, having in mind that, in a way, it reflects all processes from political life in narrower settings. Namely, a number of MP's take part in the debates representing various sides -those wanting to preserve the power and those wanting to win it over. The constant power struggle and the media exposure make parliaments institutional arenas featuring processes that are "at the heart of western democracies" (Bayley 2004, 9) .
Even though it plays a central role, strong epistemic modality has not been much explored within political discourse. Moreover, this particular type of epistemic modality seems to be generally underinvestigated in linguistics. This, however, is not the case with hedging, its weak counterpart within the system of epistemic modality. This paper is an attempt to systematically present linguistic devices expressing strong epistemic modality, having in mind that these are essential and omnipresent in politics. Both precise quantitative and qualitative methodology are used, with the aim of collecting information on the presence of strong epistemic modality in the UK parliamentary discourse, identifying the most frequent devices used to express it and their various functions in political language.
Theoretical background
As the theoretical background for the examination at hand, I present brief overviews of strong epistemic modality and parliamentary discourse.
Strong epistemic modality
Epistemic modality (also referred to as persuasiveness or inferentiality (Piper et al. 2005, 643) ) relates to modifying the utterance in the sense of expressing confidence, truthfulness and probability. Simply put, it refers to the degree of the speaker's certainty that what s/he is saying is true (de Haan 2005, 29) . If probability were quantified and assigned values between 0 and 1, such that 1 expressed factivity, than this would be the epistemic necessity (Trbojević-Milošević 2004, 32) . The subject of this analysis are therefore all forms of epistemic modality having values approaching 1, i.e. factivity, or "strong" epistemic judgments and evidentials, whereby the speaker's commitment to the truth and the probability of an utterance is positive to a great degree.
In this overview, I do not distinguish between epistemic modality and evidentiality, as is the case in newer theoretical works which present modality more elaborately (such as Cornellie's (2009) ), but I rely on traditional broad definitions that regard evidentiality as part of epistemic modality (such as Palmer's (1988 Palmer's ( , 2001 ), keeping in mind that I am to do a pragmatic analysis on a sizeable corpus, whereby it could be somewhat difficult to divide the two in practice. For the discourse-oriented results which I expect, this broader definition is sufficient and more practical.
Surveying the literature, no systematic research methodology for the study of this type of modality has been found and very few accounts of its application and implications in political discourse. Among the rare papers dealing with the topic, my attention was especially caught by Simon-Vandenbergen's (1997) article on modal (un)certainty in political discourse. The researcher uses the term 'modal certainty', a semantic notion resting on the fact that speakers aim to convey a high degree of commitment to the validity of their propositions (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997, 344) . She also allows for scalarity to be applied to this type of modality and recognises the following choices of the possible values: neutral, expressing lack of commitment (median value); tentative, expressing weak commitment (low value); and assertive, expressing strong commitment (high value) (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997, 344 ). Strong epistemic modality would then correspond to the high-value modality in Simon-Vandenbergen's terms.
Cornillie also speaks of "different degrees of speaker commitment" (2007, 194) but does not define how many degrees there might be. Occasionally, the author uses terms such as "intermediate degree of reliability" (Cornillie 2007, 21) , as well as 'low' and 'high commitment' -however, these seem to be just approximations used to better define Spanish auxiliaries and not an attempt at a categorisation of the levels of commitment. Additionally, Cornillie concludes that "it is not clear … whether there is a generally accepted scale of reliability" (Cornillie 2007, 21) and that the degree of reliability depends on the speaker's processing of the knowledge (Cornillie 2007, 22) . In this vein, Wilcox and Shaffer conclude that modal strength plays an important role in the epistemic domain, signalling the speaker's degree of epistemic commitment, from tentative to fully confident (2005, 229) .
Drawing on Huddleston and Pullum (2002, 177) , Collins (2009, 25-26 ) also identifies three levels of epistemic modality, calling the intermediary degree 'medium modality'. Additionally, Nuyts (2005, 11) also argues that there are three degrees of epistemic modality -strong forms (e.g. clearly, obviously, logical), moderate forms (e.g. appear, plausible, presumably), and weak forms (e.g. seem(ingly)), the same way Choi does (2005, 142) by stating that "a speaker may estimate that the events or states expressed in the proposition are possible, probable or certain."
In turn, Simon-Vandenbergen relies on Halliday's interpersonal function of modality (1970) , in which 'possible' contrasts with 'certain' as the lower versus the higher value. Halliday also recognises a distinction between relative and absolute certainty within 'certain' -between what he terms 'virtually certain' and 'certain' (Halliday 1970, 334) . Additionally, in his account, modality can be either straight or modified, by 'undertone' or 'overtone'. If 'toned up', it takes the form of an emphatic assertion or an assertion contrasting with some kind of reservation, Halliday concludes. The 'toned up' modality functioning as an emphatic assertion is the kind of modality which belongs to the field of strong epistemic modality, which I want to explore within political discourse.
Furthermore, Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007) provide a comprehensive study of the English adverbs expressing modal certainty. They also ask the common question of whether piling up modal markers of certainty still expresses less certainty than an unmodalised assertion. Traditionally, certainty markers are said to be used when there is actually doubt of the truth of the utterance. Such grading, authors claim, is only one part of the meaning which conditions the use of certainty markers. The rhetorical function has to be accounted for as well -the markers "have to do with the ways in which speakers want to position themselves in current discourse, vis-à-vis other voices, with the extent to which they wish to open up or close down the dialogue" (Simon-Vandenbergen, Aijmer 2007, 33) . In political discourse, where most of what is discussed and communicated consists of propositions expressing stances and beliefs and not hard facts, modal markers of certainty play a special discourse and rhetorical role -that of convincing and making the discourse argumentatively stronger.
Parliamentary discourse and epistemic modality
Considerable efforts have been made to study the discourse of parliament as of late, probably due to the fact that the parliament is perceived as "the principal icon of high politics" (Gelabert-Desnoyer 2008, 409) . From a pragmatic perspective, researchers have mostly focused on politeness , 2003b David et al. 2009; Bevitori 2004; Yetkin 2006) , evasive techniques and adversarialness (Rasiah 2007; Fenton-Smith 2008) , as well as the use of pronouns (Gelabert-Desnoyer 2008; Ilie 2010) . Epistemic modality and especially strong epistemic modality, however, have not been systematically studied in parliamentary language.
Parliamentary debate has been described as a prototypical instance of deliberative genre, although it is mixed with forensic and epideitic genres to a lesser extent (Ilie 2004, 46) . At the same time, this genre is considered to be "an influential and authoritative genre" (van der Valk 2003, 315) , which is "typically formal and predominantly argumentative" (Archakis and Tsakona 2010, 913) . The fact that this is primarily an argumentative genre in which the task of the participating MP's in reality is to not to convince the other MP's (as this can hardly be expected), but to influence the popular opinion and the public image of the MP and his/her party (Ilie 2010, 886) , studying epistemic modality, i.e. the degrees to which the MP's are certain of what they are proposing, is not only logical but, possibly, one of the principal pragmatic topics to be investigated within this type of discourse. The epistemic modality underlies argumentative structures, which should be a prominent object of analysis in the study of parliamentary debates (Van Dijk 2000, 13) . It makes sense to assume that strong epistemic modality, i.e. certainty, prevails over weak epistemic modality, i.e. doubt, in this discourse, having in mind that its aim is to convince others.
The devices used within the framework of strong epistemic modality are part of the advocacy vocabulary employed in parliamentary debates, to adopt the classification of the vocabulary used in parliaments as performed by Bara and colleagues (Bara et al. 2007, 10; 2007b, 584) , which also presupposes two additional categories for parliamentary vocabulary -substantive, which depends on the concrete topic of the debate and may be either legal, medical, moral or social, for example, and procedural, referring to the vocabulary used to conduct and manage the debate. Therefore, the focus of the paper is the advocacy parliamentary vocabulary viewed through modality lenses.
Epistemic modality has been somewhat studied within stance research as applied in the study of political discourse in general and parliamentary discourse in particular, which is relevant to the topic of investigation in this paper. Marin Arrese (2007, 23) differentiates between effective and epistemic stance, drawing on Langacker (2009) . The latter refers to the knowledge of the speaker regarding the realisation of the event and his/her evaluation of the validity of the proposition (Marin Arrese 2007, 23) . Epistemic modality, basically, is the expression of the speaker's stance (Hoye 2008, 100) and it is part of persuasion, intended "to construct a competent, trustworthy, powerful professional identity that can influence deliberative and decision making processes" (Vasilescu 2010, 371) . In parliamentary discourse, it is "an intentional, planned, goal-driven activity, a constitutive part of the discourse itself" (Vasilescu 2010, 371) . This is in line with Chilton's finding (2004, 111-117) , which identifies two basic types of legitimisation in political discourseepistemic and deontic. The former is related to the speaker's claim to have better knowledge, recognition of the 'real' facts, the claim to be more rational, more objective, "even more advanced in his mode of thought than rivals or adversaries" (Chilton 2004, 117) . As legitimatisation is the core activity of MP's, studying strong epistemic modality as one of its main instruments may prove useful in understanding the process.
Corpus, methodology, hypotheses
The corpus for this research consists of the transcripts of the first day of the budget debate held in the UK House of Commons in March 2010. The budget debates in the UK are considered to be the most important debates in the House and this particular one was held two months before the general election.
The Hansard transcripts were edited on the basis of the video available on the website of the UK parliament so as to obtain a verbatim transcript. The details of this part of the corpus follow: The material was first manually processed to find items expressing modal certainty and later the tokens were checked using TextSTAT® 2.8 (Hüning 2009 ), to confirm their frequency. The certainty markers were then sorted according to the part of speech they belong to. The most frequent items were subsequently qualitatively analysed in their context.1 The corpus is divided into the position (Labour, which was then in power) and the opposition (other parties, mostly Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) turns, to allow for comparison of the use of strong epistemic modality by the two groups. This is the secondary aim of the research -to establish whether there are any differences in the use of these devices by the position and the opposition MP's.
It is hypothesised that: a) out of the categories analysed (strong epistemic adverbs, verbs, adjectives and nouns), the most frequently used will be strong epistemic adverbs and verbs, as English favours expressing modality through modal verbs (Biber et al. 1999, 483; McCarthy 2006, 638) and modal adverbs (Hoye and Zdrenghea 1995, 26; Sion 2003, 49) , i.e. through processes rather than states. The strong epistemic modal verbs are expected to play a minor role presence-wise. This finding, if corroborated, may be relevant for future research, as most analyses have thus far investigated modality in political discourse and, in general, have focused almost exclusively on modal verbs. b) some strong epistemic markers will be used in a way which is somewhat different compared to everyday language and which is typical of parliamentary discourse. This is especially expected for pragmatic markers such as I think, I believe etc., which pervade political discourse. The aim of the paper is to describe the use of these markers in the parliamentary context. c) the presence of strong epistemic modality will differ in the language of the Labour and the opposition parties. As the opposition parties won the subsequent elections, one might expect that they were more convincing, i.e. that they expressed a stronger epistemic stance. d) the presence of strong epistemic modality in parliamentary discourse will be higher than in everyday general English. For this purpose, the normalised frequencies of some of the most frequent items from the corpus will be compared to the frequencies of such items in the BNC and the spoken BNC (SBNC), where this is feasible. Though I generally do expect higher frequencies in the corpus for most strong epistemic markers, I do not expect all of them be more frequent in parliamentary discourse in comparison to the spoken BNC, as some of the items could prove more typical of informal, spoken English and atypical of formal political talk.
A comprehensive comparison of all items studied with the BNC/SBNC results was not possible because most of the items would have to be manually filtered to include only the uses which express strong epistemic modality. In addition, the list of devices presented in this paper would have to be extended to include all items expressing strong epistemic modality in English in general if I was to compare the overall presence of strong epistemic modality in the mentioned corpora, which would be very difficult. In light of this, the paper aims to characterise the frequency and patterning of strong epistemic modality in UK parliamentary discourse through identification, classification and quantification of the strong epistemic markers observed, study the role of the markers and their rhetorical potential, as well as compare their use in the discourse of the Labour and the opposition2.
Results
The review of strong epistemic modality in parliamentary discourse starts with adverbs and adverb phrases used to strengthen the truth of the utterance / part of the utterance.
Strong epistemic adverbs
Adverbs used to reinforce the truth of an utterance are called emphasisers, according to the terminology employed by Quirk. Emphasisers are thus a subtype of subjuncts concerned with expressing "the semantic role of modality which have a reinforcing effect on the truth value of the clause of part of the clause to which they apply" (Quirk et al. 1983, 583) . As they reinforce the truth, they express strong epistemic modality. Their use presupposes a common ground which is undisputable and supposedly shared by all sides, which comes in handy in political discourse.
I start by giving an overview of the emphasisers found in the corpus, along with their raw and normalised frequency per 1,000 words: The first finding is that the most frequently used emphasisers are of course, actually and certainly. Additionally, the results from Table 2 point to a slightly more frequent use of the emphasisers by the opposition MP's, which shall be commented on in the discussion section of the paper. Here I commence by analysing the most frequent emphasisers, starting with of course. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, 204 ) compare a selection of corpora of the English language and come to the conclusion that of course is the most frequent epistemic adverb expressing certainty and that it is most frequently used in demonstrations, broadcast interviews, non-broadcast speeches, parliamentary debates and broadcast discussions. The results of this research corroborate such findings. Additionally, I checked the frequency of this emphasiser in the BNC corpus -0.30 per 1,000 words and the spoken BNC -0.56 per 1,000 words. Comparing with the results I found -1.00 per 1,000 words -the conclusion is that this emphasiser is used more than three times as much as in general English and almost twice as much as in spoken English.3 Taking into account that parliamentary debate is an argumentative genre, the benefit of using this emphasiser by an MP is obvious -the underlying message of his/her speech is then 'what I am saying here is obvious, we all know this, I am just reminding you of these facts':
(1) DARLING: …Plans for Crossrail and Heathrow, along with high-speed trains, will improve transport in this country and support some 100,000 jobs over the coming years. Roads, of course, are an essential part of our transport network… (2) BELL: …And of course we need banking reform, it is very necessary to have banking reform, but banking reform on an international basis… (3) MARRIS: …That is true not only of cider but particularly beer, which is a major drink in our society. Cider, of course, is a great drink, but less widely drunk in the UK… It is common knowledge that, for example, roads are an essential part of the transport network and that cider is a great drink. Stating the obvious is generally the basic function of the emphasiser, but in parliamentary discourse its meaning may get abused. Namely, this emphasiser is frequently employed to presuppose obvious and common knowledge even with disputable or highly controversial propositions. This emphasiser, therefore, has a huge manipulative potential -let us analyse the following extract from the debate: (4) HOSIE: …Selly Oak (Lynne Jones) also mentioned the fiscal stimulus. Indeed, one of the few times that she actually praised the Government was when she said that they had taken a lead in some of their work to tackle the difficulties of the recession (…) so while I agree with many of the things that have been done, the idea that the UK took the lead is of course false… MP Hosie states that the idea delivered by MP Jones is of course false. In accusing the opposing MP of telling 'untruths', Hosie employs the emphasiser of course, thus implying factivity for his proposition and strengthening the epistemic certainty in a highly problematic context, sending a strong message to the 'overhearing' audience that he is right.
The second manipulative use of this adverb was described by Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, (206) (207) . Namely, they state that the use of of course signals the "superior knowledge" of the speaker, which is effective in persuasive discourse:
(5) MARRIS: …The three main pub chains in the United Kingdom are based in the west midlands -Enterprise Inns, Punch Taverns and, of course, Marston's, as it now is, but Banks's, as my hon. Friend and I have known it for 40 or more years. I am proud to say that Banks's brewery, as it was -Marston's now -is headquartered in my constituency… As illustrated in example 5, MP Marris mentions three main pub chains in the UK, and employs of course before giving the name of the last one (Marston's), although this is not quite common knowledge and a piece of information which the majority of the other MP's would know of. The superior knowledge of the speaker is also implied in the rest of his utterance, where he states that he has known this for 40 or more years.
After I have described the basic use of of course and its two manipulative uses, I conclude the analysis of this emphasiser by adding that it often assumes a concessive meaning. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, 209) also noted this use of of course. Let us examine the following examples: (6) BELL: …And the right hon. Gentleman has to explain to me how he can cut public expenditure without cutting services. Of course, he makes a distinction in respect of front-line services, but the fact is that the Conservative party policy is to cut public expenditure. It is to balance the books. We understand that; it is a philosophy that they have… (7) REDWOOD: …Now of course, the Labour party is right that nobody comes into politics to sack teachers and nurses and make hospitals worse. None of us has ever wanted that, and it is quite unfair for anyone to suggest that we do. But when the state employs 6 million people, and when a very small minority of that 6 million are those front-line teachers, nurses and doctors, we do have to look at the whole panoply of the state's administration and bureaucracy, and that we have to discover ways to do more for less, because we are running out of money… (8) MARRIS: …And of course, putting up duty on cider to a swinging level may have an effect on chemical cider, and on drinking in a way that contributes to antisocial behaviour too often, but it will also hurt pubs… What we notice in the examples is that in the majority of them, of course is paired up with but. Another finding is that such use of this emphasiser is most commonly found in the MP's comments to others' addresses. In this way, the speaker acknowledges that one part of the argumentation employed by the other MP is correct, but then proceeds to contest the other arguments proposed. The speaker thus manages to background the arguments of the other MP and foreground his/her own. I found this to be one of the most commonly used parliamentary argumentative strategy in the corpus I analysed.
The next on the list of emphasisers is the adverb actually. As pointed out by Smith and Jucker (2000, 23) , actually can play "a role in the negotiation of the epistemic status of a claim" and "change the intensity of commitment to the claim". This adverb points to what 'the reality' is, i.e. what the reality is as perceived by the speaker, and what can be noticed is that it is mostly used when the speaker's perception of reality is opposite to that of the others. This emphasiser therefore suggests a change of direction: (9) CAMERON: …They did not tell us that page 169 of the Red Book shows that business investment is actually falling by 5 per cent this year… (10) TAYLOR: …One thing I did not see was any concept of our international position. We have a relatively weak currency at the moment, which is normally regarded as a good thing -people say, 'Terrific. We can get manufacturing and other exports rising.' Actually, that requires markets into which we can sell, and many other countries are undergoing great difficulties at the moment… (11) GARDINER: …And quite frankly, if cuts in public spending simply mean more voluntary redundancies, they may actually result in less efficient Departments which achieve less for the Government, albeit spending less at the same time… In examples 9-11, actually is used to introduce arguments which refute other MPs' propositions. Namely, business investment is falling rather than rising and it is implied that the opposing party, i.e. the Labour party in this case, suggested otherwise, although that may not have been the case. Actually in parliamentary discourse may be used in manipulative contexts, suggesting opposition to imaginary arguments which thus come to life. A similar situation is found in example 10, where a quote is refuted, and this time again words are put into the mouth of those the speaker does not agree with, after which they are contested -whereby it looks as if the speaker has won the argument.
Similar to of course is the adverb certainly, the third-ranked by frequency among the emphasisers. Earlier research on the use of certainly suggests that this quantity adverb may be used to emphasise the conviction of the speaker that a proposition is true in an uncertain state of affairs in which the opposite would be assumed (compare with Simon-Vandenbergen 2008 , 1523 1540) . However, such use of this emphasiser has not been found in my corpus. The only meaning in which it was used in the parliamentary debate which is the subject of this research was to intensify the utterance, particularly when MP's explain their stance, as in 12-14:
(12) JONES: …But I am certainly not advocating the idea that all our banks and financial institutions should be nationalized… (13) McFALL: …I mentioned the issue of public anger, but I want refer to that later, because I mentioned also financial inclusion, and I certainly welcome the Government's policy on basic bank accounts… (14) TAYLOR: …So, we do live in this global economy and although I certainly do not share view the of the Prime Minister that he saved the world during the middle of the debt crisis, I do give him credit for understanding that, regardless of the problems in UK, this was solvable only if we look around the world and try to get agreement… What was also noticed is that certainly always modified one utterance element (for example the verb, as in the examples), and it hardly ever modified the whole utterance (in which case it would be found either initially or finally, separated by a pause).
When it comes to the frequencies of actually and certainly, their presence in the parliamentary debate was significantly higher than in the BNC (0.78 and 0.42 in the parliamentary discourse vs. 0.25 and 0.18 in BNC, per 1,000 words, respectively), as was expected. However, if the parliamentary frequencies of these items are compared to the spoken BNC frequencies, the results deviate for actually -1.28 per 1,000 words in spoken English, compared to 0.78 in my corpus (the result for certainly is 0.31 in the SBNC). This could be accounted for by genre and register dispersion of this emphasiser, i.e. it can be explained by the fact that actually is mostly used in spoken informal English, which differs from the formal register of parliamentary English.
Strong epistemic verbs
On the basis of the review of strong epistemic modality as provided by Trbojević-Milošević (2004) , I provide a list of strong epistemic modal verbs: cannot, could not4, must5, have got6, should (+perfect infinitive), ought (+perfect infinitive)7 and will (with a predictive meaning)8. I also add semi-modals, among which the only one used in the corpus I analysed was be bound to. Table 3 presents the frequencies of these verbs when used epistemically: Very few modals were used to indicate strong epistemic modality. The frequencies of these verbs are just too low to draw any conclusions. That is why in the next section I deal with other verbs which are used to express strong epistemic modality in parliamentary discourse. I take into account the instances in which the verbs were used with first person subjects (I and we), as only in this way do they express strong commitment to the truth of the utterance. In these cases, explicit personal responsibility is taken for what is said, i.e. the MP's, individually or collectively, are the sole source of the evaluation given. I agree with Marin Arrese (2007, 92) , who finds that in cases where the conceptualiser is construed generically with verbs, i.e. through impersonal evidential predicates (It seems, It sounds…), predicates with that as the subject (that suggests, that appears…) and agentless passives (It was felt that…), the responsibility taken is 'opaque'. These are at best medium evidentiary validity markers and, therefore, bear somewhat lower certainty, which is why they do not fall into the strong epistemic modality field. The research by Simon-Vandenbergen (1997b; 2001) showed that the phrase I think in English and Dutch in the language of parliament and politics in general was far more often used to express the authority of the speaker than to mitigate or hedge. These results are corroborated by Fetzer (2008, 391) , who states that in political discourse this phrase is used to intensify the epistemic certainty. The dual nature of this pragmatic marker ('deliberative' and 'tentative') has also been confirmed by Holmes (1990) and Kärkkäinen (2003) . Thus, Holmes (1990, 187) finds that in some cases when I think is used, 'the speaker is in no doubt at all about the proposition she is asserting; she uses I think to add weight to the statement rather than to hedge its illocutionary force'.
The findings in this paper also confirm the hypothesis -the phrase I think is used with two very different meanings -one to hedge and the other to express certainty. The two meanings can be easily differentiated on the basis of the phonological characteristics and the position of the phrase in the utterance. Let us consider a few examples:
4 Can and could can be strong epistemic modals only when negated. 5 Must, when negated, exclusively expresses deontic modality, which is why such uses were not taken into account. 6 No instances of have got (to) as the equivalent of must were found in my corpus (it was found only in the meaning to have/to possess or as the present perfect of the verb get in the meaning of reach). 7 Should and ought to are strong epistemic modals only in this structure. They generally express medium epistemicity, suggesting what is advisable as opposed to what is necessary. 8 As in Boys will be boys. No such instances were found in the corpus. and new management.
(16) JACK: That was an interesting trip down memory lane, organised, I think, by the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Sir Stuart Bell).
(17) MARRIS: Well, sadly, 'twas ever thus, was it not, with certain Janus-faced politicians in certain local authorities in the west midlands, and, I think, elsewhere? (18) JONES: It is absolutely outrageous that, £18 billion -I think -is spent on tax relief for pensions savings and 30 per cent.
In the given examples (15-18), the phrase I think is used to hedge and mitigate and paraphrases as perhaps, probably, it is possible. It is separated from the rest of the utterance by pauses, i.e. it has been additionally embedded in the utterance. I will compare these uses with the following:
(19) HEATH: Further education is where we are seeing a starvation of funds and a lack of the right sort of skills training, which I think is absolutely essential in producing the tradesmen and artisans of the future -the people we desperately need to run the economy.
(20) JONES: I accept that there will be pain in the future, but I think that cutting down on investment in our assets, in assets which will be the engine of our future growth and prosperity is very short-sighted.
(21) McFALL: And I think that comment is very important, particularly in the face of the deficit hawks who want to cut now and cut severely.
(22) JACK: And I think we must recognise that in humanitarian terms.
…I think we have to be realistic.
Examples 19-22, which illustrate the vast majority of the uses of the phrase I think in the corpus, feature this phrase as strongly interwoven in the utterance. There are no pauses to separate it and it modifies the meaning of the utterance in the sense that the speaker sends the message 'it is my strong opinion that'. In these cases, the phrase is almost always used initially and the subordinator that can be added without any difference. An additional proof of such use of the phrase is the overall modality of the utterance -the words underlined suggest intensification (very, absolutely essential) and strong deontic modality (must, have to) . If the phrase were to hedge the utterance, instead of these there would be deintensifiers and other hedges. Although a small number of the utterances could have allowed for modal disharmony, the fact that such combinations are found in most of the corpus drives us to the conclusion that this is a case of strong epistemic modality. In the same vein, Holmes (1990, 187) finds that in cases when it expresses 'emphasis and confidence', I think is in the initial position and think gets level stress, whereas Kärkkäinen (2003, 112) also highlights the contextual factors that determine the meaning of the marker, such as position, intonation and the type of proposition.
Given all this, it may be concluded that the macromodality of parliamentary discourse is certainty and self-confidence and in this context the phrase I think in most cases expresses precisely this meaning. It seems that I think does not automatically nor even typically express a lack of commitment (Simon-Vandenbergen 1996) .
The same can be said of the other phrases involving verbs of perception and belief which stand nearsynonymous with I think. Table 4 presents other such phrases which were found in the corpus, in positions in which they express this meaning. Additionally, I took into account only the use of these verbs with first person subjects, as only in these cases do the verbs express the speaker's certainty.
To analyse the results from Table 4 , I take into account the findings by Anita Fetzer (2008, 393) , who concluded that in English the phrases I believe and I know express even greater certainty and commitment to the truth of the utterance by the speaker than I think. If strong epistemic modality were scaled, we would see that the strongest nuances are less used than those which are somewhat weaker.
Additionally, these strong epistemic verbs of perception and belief are much more often used than strong epistemic modal verbs but less than emphasisers. Table 5 gives the results for strong epistemic adjectives found in the corpus I analysed. As can be seen, the range of adjectives used for this purpose is limited: The use of these adjectives is associated with certain patterns. For example, clear, obvious and evident are found in copulative structures with impersonal subjects (it is clear / obvious / evident that). Sure and certain are mainly found in copulative structures with the first person personal pronoun. The frequency of use of these adjectives by the two sides of the parliament is similar. When we compare the frequencies of these items in parliamentary language and everyday language, most of them can be said to be more present in the former. However, the raw frequencies of most of the strong epistemic adjectives were fairly low in the corpus, which did not allow for a detailed and reliable comparison. Nonetheless, I will analyse the frequencies of the two most prominent items and compare them to the respective frequencies in the BNC and SBNC. Thus, clear features the frequencies of 0.24 and 0.17 in the BNC and SBNC respectively, which is much lower than the figure from the UK parliamentary debate -0.41 per 1,000 words on average. The overall presence of sure in the BNC is slightly lower than in the UK parliament (0.23 per 1,000 words vs. 0.26) although it is much more frequent in the SBNC (0.51), as this strong epistemic adjective seems to be typical of spoken, informal English.
Strong epistemic adjectives and nouns
Even though the range of strong epistemic (including evidential) nouns is limited, their normalised frequency is significant.10
The most frequent among the nouns is fact, which bears manipulative potential, keeping in mind that it presupposes an undisputable common ground:
(23) JACK: I thank the hon. Member for giving way but is he aware that already DEFRA has taken some £320 million out of their operating budget, and that they are now employing something like 1,500 less people? And yet DEFRA would claim that outputs have been sustained. This is called "improved productivity". Does he accept that fact? …It is forecasting, and forecasting is exactly what it says: it is trying to use, I will give way to hon. Member in just a moment, it is trying to use the best data to say what they think will happen, but respecting the fact that they will probably get some of it wrong… ... There may be arguments about the amounts involved, but the fact that you have to reduce the level of public spending is there… Such use of the noun fact is not rare. It is always modified by a determiner (that, the), i.e. it is not used with a generic meaning, which is why I did not find a single use of this noun in the plural in the corpus. In example above (23), although the noun fact implies factivity and certainty, as well as truth and objectivity, it refers to a disputable and controversial state of affairs: (a) the MP questions the results of the DEFRA, ironically twisting their phrase (this is called "improved productivity"); (b) he takes for granted that the government will wrongly foresee the events of the future period; (c) he says that it is a fact that the reduction of public spending is needed to boost the economy, although this is a highly contestable economic issue. This is a presupposition technique, which is a very fruitful argumentative strategy bearing manipulative potential. It is also difficult to disprove such discourse, because the MP and the public would need a substantial cognitive effort to deduce, formulate and refute the presupposition (Chilton and Schäffner, 10 The use of this noun in the phrase in fact was not counted because it was already done so in the table with emphasisers. 2002: 36), which would also be a face-threatening act. Thus, the public may adopt certain propositions as facts unselectively and even subliminally.
Comparing my results with the BNC and SBNC results, I have come to the conclusion that these strong epistemic nouns are much less used in both of the mentioned corpora than in parliamentary language. I analysed the frequency of the three most prominent strong epistemic nouns in the parliamentary discourse and the BNC and SBNC corpora. The noun fact measures a frequency of 0.20 incidences per 1,000 words in both the BNC and SBNC, compared to 0.54 in the parliament; confidence measures a frequency of 0.07 in the BNC and 0.03 in the SBNC, compared to 0.44 in my parliamentary corpus; argument measures a frequency of 0.08 and 0.05 in the BNC and SBNC respectively, in comparison with 0.26 in the parliament. It can be said that this argumentative vocabulary is typical of political discourse and that the frequency of its strong epistemic nouns is immense, compared to everyday language.
Discussion and conclusions
At this point, I sum up the results related to the use of strong epistemic modality in the UK parliamentary discourse: Before I proceed to give a brief contrastive analysis of the Labour/opposition discourse, I shall give a brief general overview of the comprehensive results arising from this study. In all categories, except for other strong modal epistemic verbs, the opposition resorts to stronger epistemic modality and the overall normalised frequency of this modality is in its favour. By far, the most frequent mode of expressing this modality is through emphasisers, i.e. strong epistemic adverbs. The runners-up are strong epistemic verbs. What can be noticed is that strong epistemic modality is much more frequently expressed through modifying verbs, i.e. processes, than nouns, i.e. states, and this might be a consequence of the characteristics of the English language and not a parliamentary language-specific feature (on verbs as the central means of expressing modality in English see: Biber et al. (1999, 483); McCarthy (2006, 638) ). Such results point to the fact that when examining modality in political talk or other genres, modal adverbs and verbs expressing modality (other than the most typical modal verbs) must particularly be taken into account, as they seem to be the most frequent means of expressing it. This is the case at least for strong epistemic modality. What is parliamentary specific is the overall high presence of these devices in the debate. What allowed us to draw such a conclusion is testing the frequency of some of the most prominent items from my corpus against the BNC and SBNC results. They were mostly found much more frequent in parliament and in the cases where the findings deviated from such expectations, one of the reasons which could account for such a difference could be their being atypical of formal political discourse. My hypothesis regarding a significant frequency of strong epistemic modality in parliamentary language was thus confirmed.
There is more certainty in the discourse of the opposition, although the difference is not that huge. I remind that this budget debate came just two months before the general elections (in which the opposition won). Strong epistemic vocabulary seems to be part of the aggressive political/marketing campaign and the opposition seems to have been more successful in sounding convincing, among many other factors which contributed to their discourse's success.
There is a remarkable consistency in the results, in the sense that in the three categories (strong epistemic nouns, adjectives and adverbs) there is more epistemic certainty from the opposition side. The same goes for strong modal epistemic verbs -but the results regarding other strong modal epistemic verbs were not in line with this. There are several ways to interpret the deviation -it could be just a coincidence, which could be dispelled or confirmed by future research on a bigger corpus; the Labour might prefer using those strong epistemic verbs (perhaps imitating a charismatic leader); there could be a flaw in the presupposition that the listed phrases indeed express strong epistemic modality. I stand by my previous conclusions that those are the cases of strong epistemic modality, mostly relying on the fact that they are usually paired up with other markers of this modality, but I do suggest that perhaps further research (including psychological) is needed on this topic. Since these verb phrases are found initially in the utterance, the other strong epistemic markers which follow could be some sort of auto-correction by an MP who realises that his/her discourse is not persuasive enough.
I analysed the pragmatics of the marker I think, agreeing mostly with previous research (SimonVandenbergen 1996 (SimonVandenbergen , 1997 (SimonVandenbergen , 1997b (SimonVandenbergen , 2001 (SimonVandenbergen , 2008 Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007; Kärkkäinen, 2003; Holmes 1990; Fetzer 2008) on the fact that this phrase has a dual nature, ranging from the extremes of expressing tentativeness to certainty. As the latter meaning was found to prevail in this study of parliamentary discourse, this might be another proof of the prevailing presence of strong epistemic modality in parliament. The conclusion is that the pragmatics of strong epistemic markers is in some aspects different to that found in everyday language and that the parliamentary context must be taken into account so as to account for their semantics. Further, an interesting result of the analysis of the use of I think concerns the concurrences -the epistemic adverbials can serve as a key factor in finding out which meaning I think is going to express. Perhaps this area -concurrences of the elements expressing epistemicity and the role they play in unravelling the meaning of the modal frame -merits further future investigation.
Similar systematic presentations of strong epistemic modality, which allow for quantification, could be employed on a variety of political texts, with the ultimate goal of comparing its levels with various speakers and parties, as well as further qualitative analyses of its use in linguistic terms.
